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At the Crossroads of Company 
and Insolvency Law
By Seppo Villa, Professor, LL.D. & Matti Engelberg, Founding Partner, LL.D.1
The article discusses one of the most fundamental aspects of corporate law, namely the interse­
ction between company law and insolvency law, with specific regard to the recent EU Directive 
on Preventive Restructuring (EU 2019/1023, the ‘Restructuring Directive’ or ‘Directive’)2. It notes 
the forthcoming implementation of the Directive in the EU Member States. The key options for 
implementation of the Directive available to European legislators are introduced, including an 
option based on company law which, according to the recent LL.D.­dissertation of the co­author, 
would provide more tools for restructurings than are available under the frame works based on 
insolvency law. This would create efficient mechanisms in particular for the preventive restructu­
ring of solvent companies, but also for the completion of a friendly takeover of a publicly­listed 
company through a scheme of arrangement under company law. The scheme of arrangement 
mechanism has also been included in the recently published European Model Company Act.
1. The New Approach of the Restructuring 
Directive 1 2
The aforementioned Restructuring Directive 
came into force in July 2019. Each Member Sta-
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te now has a period of two years (extendable 
up to three years) in which to implement the 
Directive. The Directive, particularly in the mo-
dified form in which it was finally enacted, con-
tains important features for legislators to con-
sider. The key issues relate to the crossover of 
company law and insolvency law in the Mem-
ber States, noting the impact on the position of 
share holders in restructuring processes.
This article discusses the key provisions of 
the Directive relating to the treatment of share-
holders in restructurings and outlines options 
for implementing the principles for preventive 
restructuring in the Directive through a com-
pany law scheme of arrangement mechanism.
For the first topic, the final form of the Direc-
tive introduces, even as a principal option, a new 
relative priority rule for restructuring proceed-
ings. In recent legal writing, the merits of the rela-
tive priority rule compared to the absolute priority 
rule have been heavily debated. However, the 
debate does not, perhaps, adequately address 
the practical requirements of a restructuring 
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process. Flexibility for the courts and restructur-
ing professionals to give incentives to each class 
of stakeholders in a restructuring  scenario is a 
key driver for the new rule. A reference to this 
discussion is made in chapter 5 below.
The recitals to the Directive outline that a 
restructuring should enable debtors in financial 
difficulties to continue their business, in whole 
or in part, by changing the composition, condi-
tions or structure of their assets and their liabi-
lities or any other part of their capital structure 
– including by sales of assets or parts of the busi-
ness or, where so provided under national law, 
the business as a whole – as well as by carrying 
out operational changes. Unless otherwise pro-
vided for specifically by national law, operatio-
nal changes, such as the termination or amend-
ment of contracts or the sale or other disposal of 
assets, should comply with the general require-
ments under national law for such measures, in 
particular civil law and labour law rules. Any 
debt-to-equity swaps should also comply with 
safeguards in national law. Preventive restruc-
turing frameworks should, above all, enable de-
btors to restructure effectively at an early stage 
and to avoid insolvency, thus limiting the unne-
cessary liquidation of viable enterprises. Those 
frameworks should help to prevent job losses 
and the loss of know-how and skills, and maxi-
mise the total value to creditors – in comparison 
to what they would receive in the event of the 
liquidation of the enterprise’s assets or in the 
event of the next-best-alternative scenario in the 
absence of a plan – as well as to owners and the 
economy as a whole.3
Company law is referred to in many sec-
tions of the Directive. According to the Directi-
ve’s recitals, while a company’s shareholders’ or 
other equity holders’ legitimate interests should 
be protected, Member States should ensure that 
they cannot unreasonably prevent the adop-
tion of restructuring plans that would bring the 
deb tor back to viability. Member States should 
3 Restructuring Directive, recital 2
be able to use different means to achieve that 
goal, for example by not giving equity holders 
the right to vote on a restructuring plan and by 
not making the adoption of a restructuring plan 
conditional on the agreement of equity holders 
that, upon a valuation of the enterprise, would 
not receive any payment or other consideration 
if the normal ranking of liquidation priorities 
were applied. However, where equity holders 
have the right to vote on a restructuring plan, 
a judicial or administrative authority should be 
able to confirm the plan by applying the rules on 
cross-class cram down notwithstanding the dis-
sent of one or more classes of equity holders. The 
Member States that exclude equity holders from 
voting should not be required to apply the ab-
solute priority rule in the relation ship between 
creditors and equity holders. Another possible 
means of ensuring that equity holders do not 
unreasonably prevent the adoption of restruc-
turing plans would be to ensure that restructu-
ring  measures that directly affect equity holders’ 
rights, and that need to be approved by a general 
meeting of shareholders under company law, 
are not subject to any unreasonably high majori-
ty requirements and that equity holders have no 
competence in terms of restructuring measures 
that do not directly affect their rights.4
The recitals of the Directive further empha-
sise that the effectiveness of the adoption 
and implementation of the restructuring plan 
should not be jeopardised by company law. 
There fore, Member States should be able to 
derogate from the requirements laid down in 
the directive (EU) 2017/1132 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council concerning the 
obligations to convene a general meeting and to 
offer shares on a pre-emptive basis to existing 
shareholders, to the extent and for the period 
necessary to ensure that shareholders do not 
frustrate restructuring efforts by abusing their 
rights under that directive.5
4 Restructuring Directive, recital 57
5 Restructuring Directive, recital 96
36151_NTS_nr1_2020.indd   61 15-04-2020   10:03:53
Side 62  NTS  |  Nr. 1  |  2020
Seppo Villa & Matti Engelberg 
For example, Member States might need to 
derogate from the obligation to convene a gene-
ral meeting of shareholders or from certain time 
periods in cases where urgent action is needed 
by the management to safeguard the assets of 
the company, for instance through requesting 
a stay of individual enforcement ac tions and 
when there is a serious and sudden loss of sub-
scribed capital and a likelihood of insolvency. 
Derogations from company law might also be 
required when the restructuring plan provides 
for the emission of new shares which could be 
offered with priority to creditors as debt- for-
equity swaps, or for the reduction of the amount 
of subscribed capital in the event of a transfer 
of parts of the undertaking. Such derogations 
should be limited in time to the extent that 
Member States consider such derogations ne-
cessary for the establishment of a preventive 
restructuring framework.6 The Restructuring 
Directive notes that directive (EU) 2017/1132 
should therefore be amended accordingly.
2. At the crossroads of company and insol-
vency law – Why and How?
As outlined above, this article discusses the in-
tersection between company and insolvency 
law in the context of the Restructuring Directi-
ve on the one hand, and the potential usage of 
modern company law frameworks for restruc-
turing on the other.
The Restructuring Directive, as a starting 
point, refers to a test of a likelihood of insol-
vency. However, what is meant by ‘likelihood’ 
is not further specified in the Directive. As there 
always is ‘a’ likelihood of insolvency, however 
small, this is unfortunate. Every company has a 
likelihood of insolvency – though for some com-
panies such a likelihood may be greater than 
for others.7
6 Ibid.
7 Horst Eidenmüller, Contracting for a Euro-
pean Insolvency Regime, European Business 
Law Review (2017), 18:279
However, the final version of the Directive 
clarifies that Member States should be able to 
maintain, or introduce into their respective legal 
systems, preventive restructuring frameworks 
other than those provided for in the Directive. 
Hence it would be fully legitimate for a legisla-
tor to address preventive restructuring with a 
company law framework as opposed to an in-
solvency law regime, as is the current status in 
English and Irish Law.
Any test that requires a company to have 
‘a likelihood of insolvency’ or to be somewhere 
close to insolvency does not seem suitable as a 
requirement for an arrangement or a compro-
mise, and would be difficult for a court to deter-
mine. The appropriate test, in such a scenario, 
should work from the opposite angle, as is cur-
rently the case under English law. One should 
consider (i) whether any need for a compro-
mise and/or an arrangement exists, and if so, 
(ii) whether a proposal made by the company, 
supported by a clear majority of each class who-
se rights are proposed to be altered, is fair and 
justified.
When considering the legal tools for pre-
ventive restructurings that are closer to those 
customarily available in insolvency procee-
dings, including, for instance, a stay against any 
creditor claims, one may see a further need for 
such ‘a like lihood of insolvency’ test as a me-
ans of avoid ing abuse of the procedures. Such 
a distinction has also been presented in a study 
conducted by leading Insolvency Law profes-
sionals for the European Law Institute (the ‘ELI 
Study’).8 Only the frameworks referred to in the 
ELI Study as ‘restructuring proceedings’ require 
the debtor to show ‘severe financial  difficulties’ 
to justify access to restructuring tools. Recom-
mendation 1.25 of the ELI Study notes that pro-
8 European Law Institute, Rescue of Business in 
Insolvency Law, 6.9.2017 available at: <https: // 
www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/about-the-
eli/bodies/general-assembly/default-title/
rescue-of-businessand-insolvency-law/>
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ceedings with a view to a ‘work-out’ should 
not require a specific access test referring to the 
situation of the debtor’s business. Instead, the 
court should only require the debtor to submit 
a work-out agreement with sufficient creditor 
support according to the stipulated majority 
requirements. When considering options for a 
new preventive restructuring regime, a jurisdic-
tion that already has a developed insolvency 
law framework for restructuring may indeed 
find it appropriate to analyse the benefits of de-
veloping a separate regime for the ‘preventive’ 
restructuring.
When considering the optimal preventive 
legal restructuring framework for Member Sta-
tes, the English company law scheme of arran-
gement, as well as providing a well-functioning 
example, could serve, de minimis, as a useful 
benchmark for legislators, at the same time aid-
ing the further development of existing collec-
tive restructuring regimes, in accordance with 
the guidelines of the Directive.
Importantly, when a legal framework for 
effective restructuring is either missing or does 
not function effectively, small minority holders 
of financial instruments gain disproportionate 
power and can cause trouble to all stakeholders 
of a company. Such behaviour is customarily 
referred to as usage (or abuse) of hold-out posi-
tions in connection with any compromise or ar-
rangement which calls for unanimous consent 
(for example, because the law or the terms of the 
instrument do not provide otherwise).
Figure 1 illustrates a hypothetical showing 
the matrix of the financial and economic con-
dition of a company and the related needs for 
preventive and restructuring legal frameworks 
for the company and its stakeholders.9 The fi-
9 Matti Engelberg, the proposed EU framework 
for preventive restructuring and the English 
schemes of arrangement regime—seeking the 
best Preventive model for each Member State 
Capital Markets Law Journal, Volume 14, Issue 
2, April 2019 251–273
gure is for illustrative purposes only and aims 
to demonstrate the variable situations, depen-
ding on the financial and economic condition 
of a company, where the need for one or more 
legal frameworks to protect the company and/
or its stakeholders may arise. It is important to 
note that a scheme of arrangement framework 
is available for a company and its stakeholders 
any time there is a need for a compromise or 
arrangement with the company and its stake-
holders.
 
 
 
Further, schemes of arrangement are also 
used jointly with insolvency proceedings. Com-
bining a pre-pack administration (where the 
court approves a transfer of assets and business 
of the debtor to a company owned by the credi-
tors) with a scheme proceeding, this enables, 
economically, a completion of a debt-for-equity 
swap, even against the view of dissenting share-
holders. However, this structural mechanism 
entitles the shareholders to retain the shares. 
Though the court’s acceptance of a transfer of 
the debtor’s business and assets to a company 
owned by creditors constitutes, in economic 
36151_NTS_nr1_2020.indd   63 15-04-2020   10:03:53
Side 64  NTS  |  Nr. 1  |  2020
Seppo Villa & Matti Engelberg 
terms, a cross-class cram-down of the equity 
holders, the court process nevertheless aims to 
protect the interests of all stakeholders.
Most English public takeovers are conducted 
through a scheme process, as this is a faster and 
more predictable process than merely using a 
traditional takeover route. Particularly for di-
stressed companies, the ability to combine fea-
tures of both company and insolvency law in a 
transaction provides a high degree of flexibility. 
This flexibility is particularly important in large 
transactions. An example of such a transaction 
was the takeover by Royal Dutch Shell of the BG 
Group Plc in 2016. Valued at over $50 billion, 
this transaction was completed in only 55 days 
and resulted in the friendly bidder acquiring 
100 per cent ownership of the target.
3. Unjustified Holdouts
Professor Stephan Madaus describes a holdout 
creditor or equity holder as:
‘[a] person of such class of stakeholders who has 
voted to reject the restructuring plan while a 
majority of fellow creditors or equity holders, in 
his class or in other classes, voted to accept it. 
Holdout stakeholders are those who could not 
convince the others to reject the plan. They hold 
a minority position and stick with it, when fac-
ing the result of the voting process. Thus, they 
oppose the decision of the ‘maior et sanior pars’.’10
Abuse of holdout positions may have a detri-
mental effect on any restructuring process. The 
recent dissertation of the co-author analysed the 
changeover of the markets for corporate finan-
cing after the 2008 financial crisis, particularly 
the diversification of financing sources, and the 
consequential need to develop new frameworks 
for preventive restructuring.
10 Stephan Madaus, Leaving the Shadows of US 
Bankruptcy Law: A Proposal to Divide the Re-
alms of Insolvency and Restucturing Law, Eur 
Bus Org Law Rev (2018) 19, 636
Diversified company balance sheets aug-
ment the need to develop tools for preventive 
restructuring. Due to the financial diversificati-
on of a balance sheet, a dissenting small holder 
of equity or debt instruments of a company may 
constitute an obstacle to a proposed restructur-
ing, in that they may have a strong holdout 
position. A company law scheme of arrange-
ment framework could operate as a legal tool 
to protect companies and their key stakeholders 
against the abuse of such holdout positions.
4. Cross-Class Cram-Down
A group of highly-regarded experts working for 
the European Commission developed the con-
tent of the draft for the Restructuring Directive, 
originally published in 2016. The final version of 
the Directive contains modified sections relating 
to the so called cross-class cram-down mecha-
nism and a new section for a relative priority 
rule, substantially based on the work of this CO-
DIRE-group.11 Hence, the provisions relating to 
cross-class cram-down and the relative vs. abso-
lute priority rules are also interrelated.
Cross-class cram-down refers to a mechan-
ism whereby a restructuring plan is accepted 
by a court notwithstanding disagreement by a 
majority of a voting class. According to the Di-
rective, for the plan to be confirmed in the case 
of a cross-class cram-down, it should be suppor-
ted by a majority of voting classes of affected 
parties. At least one of those classes should be a 
secured creditor class or senior to the ordinary 
unsecured creditors class.12
11 Codire BEST PRACTICES IN EUROPEAN 
RESTRUCTURING, Contractualised Distress 
Resolution in the Light of the Draft Direc-
tive proposal of 22 November, 2016, 5.7.2018, 
Conference outline and programme, available 
at: <https://www.codire.eu/event/best-prac-
tices-in-european-restructuringcontractuali-
sed-distress-resolution-in-the-light-of-the-di-
rective-proposal-of-22-november-2016/>
12 Restructuring Directive, recital 53
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As stated in the recitals to the Directive, 
where equity holders have the right to vote on 
a restructuring plan, a judicial or administrative 
authority should be able to confirm the plan by 
applying the rules on cross-class cram-down, 
notwithstanding the dissent of one or more clas-
ses of equity holders. Member States that exclu-
de equity holders from voting should not be 
required to apply the absolute priority rule in 
the relationship between creditors and equity 
holders. Another possible means of ensuring 
that equity holders do not unreasonably pre-
vent the adoption of restructuring plans would 
be to ensure that restructuring measures that 
directly affect equity holders’ rights, and that 
need to be approved by a general meeting of 
shareholders under company law, are not sub-
ject to unreasonably high majority requirements 
and that equity holders have no competence in 
terms of restructuring measures that do not di-
rectly affect their rights.13
The possibility for direct mandatory cross-
class cram-down of equity is not included in 
the restructuring frameworks of any Nordic 
country, for example. To analyse the feasibility 
of such a regime, the Finnish government has 
completed a recent comparative survey of de-
bt-for-equity swaps, by comparing practices in 
eight jurisdictions.
In international legal writing, debt-to-equi-
ty conversion is defined as an instrument used 
in corporate restructuring where the creditors 
of a debtor company swap for, or convert cer-
tain debtor company debt into, the debtor com-
pany’s shares or share capital. This conversion 
can be conducted in several different ways de-
pending on the relevant country’s legal system, 
but the swap or conversion will always result in 
the complete cessation of, or a partial reduction 
in, the amount of unpaid debt. An evaluation 
of how national legislation governs corporate 
restructuring and corporate arrangements was 
conducted as part of the Finnish governmental 
13 Restructuring Directive, recital 57
study for purposes of determining possible re-
visions. This evaluation required a comprehen-
sive comparison of provisions governing com-
pany law, insolvency law and other corporate 
arrangement laws in certain relevant countri-
es. The countries selected for review were Swe-
den, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the United 
States of America, the Netherlands, Germany, 
France and Switzerland. The research methods 
used to conduct the review were collecting and 
reviewing written studies provided by expert 
organisations located in the compared countri-
es; conducting research on the relevant legisla-
tion, legal literature and case law; arranging in-
terviews with relevant experts; and conducting 
a comparative law study.14
5. Relative Priority Rule
The CODIRE Expert Group outlines the merits 
of the relative priority against absolute priority 
as follows:
‘However, when looking at a going concern busi-
ness and at a negotiated and voted-on restruc-
turing solution, this rigidity of the absolute pri-
ority rule can become problematic. On the one 
hand, it may make particularly difficult restruc-
turing based on plans with more than one class 
of creditors (which are instead valuable because 
14 J. Tähtinen – R. Peldán – J. Dammert, An inter-
national study on debt-to-equity conversion in 
connection with corporate arrangements and 
insolvency, Publications of the Government’s 
analysis, assessment and research activities 
6/2018, available at: <https://tietokayttoon.fi/
julkaisu?pubid=24204> The study (which, un-
fortunately for international usage, is in Fin-
nish) contains a useful comparative table with 
information on the Finnish position, compared 
with the eight other jurisdictions that are cove-
red in the study. This table would be a good 
tool for any legislator wishing to understand 
further the variation between the respective 
systems. The co-author is aiming to contribute 
a translation of the table for those who may 
have a further interest in this. 
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they allow creditors to vote according to their 
economic interests). On the other hand, the APR 
may impede or even condemn, in particular, any 
attempt to let the current shareholders retain a 
stake in the restructured business.
 The latter concern is of special importance 
with owner-run/family-run businesses and thus 
with MSMEs; it is often desirable, though, to in-
centivise the shareholders/managers to restruc-
ture early, to discourage them from holding out 
of an agreement, to contribute and commit to 
the restructuring and to apply their knowledge 
of the business in the interest of the creditors th-
roughout and after restructuring. We have heard 
evidence of this from several jurisdictions. We 
are not alone in highlighting these considerati-
ons. The American Bankruptcy Institute’s re-
port on Chapter 11 reform (2014) devotes a lot 
of attention to easing the absolute priority rule 
in different ways (including a specific and very 
sophisticated approach for MSMEs, see pp. 299-
302 of the report, Chapter VII. »Proposed Re-
commendations: Small and Medium-Sized En-
terprise (SME) Cases).
 Taking into account the role that business ow-
ners of MSMEs, in particular, may be expected 
to play in the restructuring, the absolute prio-
rity rule may even fall short of the fairness it is 
supposed to ensure for distributions in the first 
place; we advocate, thus, for a more flexible stan-
dard allowing distributions to junior classes (or 
their retention of interests and economic values) 
even before all (dissenting) senior classes are sa-
tisfied in full.’15
In the US, for Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, the absolute priority rule has been a com-
mon starting place. However, even in the US, 
the development has been towards a hybrid sy-
15 Contractualised Distress Resolution in the 
Shadow of the Law, expert group funded by 
the EU; Comments to the Proposal for Direc-
tive, draft of 25th June, 2018, 3-6, available at: 
<www.codire.eu>
stem of priority that may be more efficient than 
one centered around absolute priority.16
Professor Douglas Baird outlines key rea-
sons for the development:
‘To decide who gets what under absolute priority 
in the absence of a sale, the judge must determi-
ne the value of the firm. The empirical evidence 
does suggest that, in large reorganizations, judi-
cial valuations are unbiased, but these unbiased 
valuations are made with high variance. Even 
if bankruptcy valuations could be improved, a 
major problem remains: ‘All estimates of value 
are noisy.’ Coming within ten percent of the true 
value of the firm merits high praise even when 
the best experts do it.’17
Relative priority should be, according to the 
authors, understood merely as a developed 
deviation of the absolute priority rule, which 
would bring along more flexibility for the respe-
ctive insolvency administrator for preparing the 
restructuring programme and for the court for 
judging about this. However, even the new re-
lative priority principle, included as a principal 
option in the Directive, has also been subject to 
criticism by e.g. the Dutch professors de Weijs, 
Jonkers andMalakotipour:
‘Next to upending the basic fabric of private law, 
EU RPR disregards that the company to be re-
organized did not end up in that state by coin-
cidence. Allowing shareholders to retain shares 
whilst writing down creditors against their ma-
jority vote would not only add insult to injury 
for creditors, but would also provide a further 
subsidy to shareholders that incentivizes to over-
16 Douglas G.Baird, Priority matters: Absolute 
Priority, Relative Priority and the Costs of 
Bankruptcy, University of Pensylvania Law 
review, Vol 165, March 2017, No 4 785-786
17 Idem 785-786
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leverage companies, leading to instability in the 
economy.’ 18
As a comment to this critique, it is appropriate 
to note the counter arguments from Professor 
Bob Wessels:
‘De Weijs et al fail to appreciate that a debtor (a 
business) under the proposed Directive is not in-
solvent. This follows directly from Article 1(a), 
stating that ‘[t]his Directive lays down rules on: 
preventive restructuring frameworks available 
for debtors in financial difficulty when there is a 
likelihood of insolvency [my italics] with a view 
to preventing the insolvency and ensuring the 
viability of the debtor.’ This is why applying the 
logic and rules of insolvency law, including the 
APR, is not justified. In the absence of insol-
vency, the arguments for changing the capital 
structure of the debtor (e.g. by wiping out share-
holders and (as the case may be) junior creditors) 
are unconvincing.
 Although I understand the criticism by pro-
fessor De Weijs et al, in the gamut of proposed 
rules and tools, the RPR is seen and analysed 
as one isolated aspect. The authors are rather si-
lent on the possibility that the RPR will create 
incentives for early restructuring. In case of the 
application of the stern APR, the debtor’s com-
pany shareholders have very limited incentives 
to pursue restructuring as their equity will be 
fully wiped out. One of the major thrusts behind 
the proposed Directive is to ‘ ... enable the deb-
tors to restructure effectively at an early stage’. 
Since the introduction of the APR as the single 
option disincentivises the debtor’s directors and 
shareholders to use preventive restructuring fra-
18 de Weijs, R.J., Jonkers, A.L., Malakotipour, M. 
’The Imminent Distortion of European Insol-
vency Law: How the European Union Erodes 
the Basic Fabric of Private Law by Allowing 
’Relative Priority’, Amsterdam Law School Le-
gal Studies Research Paper No. 2019-10
meworks, it may hamper the early restructuring 
of viable debtors in financial difficulties.’19
Thus, European legislators should thoroughly 
understand the complex nature of the issue. The 
debt-to-equity conversion appears at the cross-
roads of company and insolvency law. When a 
company is economically healthy, but has dif-
ficulties with financing, the toolbox both of an 
independent professional restructuring admini-
strator, and of the relevant court monitoring the 
restructuring, should preferably be equipped 
with reasonably flexible tools.
In the Directive the key principles of the re-
lative priority rule are set out at Article 11:
…
‘(c) it ensures that dissenting voting classes of af-
fected creditors are treated at least as favourably 
as any other class of the same rank and more fa-
vourably than any junior class; and
(d) no class of affected parties can, under the re-
structuring plan, receive or keep more than the 
full amount of its claims or interests.’
But the Member States are still entitled to use 
the absolute priority as an option:
…
‘By way of derogation from point (c) of para-
graph 1, Member States may provide that the 
claims of affected creditors in a dissenting vot ing 
class are satisfied in full by the same or equiva-
lent means where a more junior class is to re-
ceive any payment or keep any interest under 
the restructuring plan.’20
19 Wessels, Bob, A reply to professor De Weijs et 
al. 22.3.2019, available at: <www.bobwessels.
nl>
20 Restructuring Directive, Article 11
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The decision between relative and absolute pri-
ority is one of the key areas that Member State 
legislators should address when implementing 
the Directive. Therefore, they should preferably 
engage in a constructive dialogue with, and re-
ceive helpful guidance from, the Directorate of 
the EU Commission in respect of these legisla-
tive options.
6. Valuation, valuation, valuation ...
It is important to note the fundamental diffe-
rence between a preventive restructuring and 
a comprehensive restructuring of a company. 
For preventive restructuring, the key focus re-
lates to the ability to bind a dissenting minority 
creditor (or minority equity holder) to a com-
promise or arrangement proposed or supported 
by the company.
For a comprehensive restructuring of a com-
pany, it is common also to cover issues relating 
to the so-called ‘division of the pie’ among dif-
ferent classes of debt and equity. For this, the 
valuation of the company is critical. In order to 
determine how much each class should be entit-
led to receive under a plan, a proper valuation 
is the cornerstone of the process.
Beveridge et al. have outlined the factors for 
a distressed company, which may have a sub-
stantial impact on the value of the company. 
These include, inter alia, weakening credit 
terms, shortage of working capital, higher fi-
nancing costs, valuation of balance sheet items 
based on a fire sale, high consulting costs, ina-
bility of the management to deal with long term 
 issues, missing investment capacity and con-
flicts among the key stakeholders of the com-
pany.21 This supports the experienced view of 
Professor Baird, that a valuation of a distressed 
company is always ‘noisy’.
21 A. Beveridge, P. Hemming, G. Smith, Valua-
tion of distress businesses, Strategies for Ma-
ximising Value, Ben Larkin,Globe Business 
Publishing Ltd, 2008 79
For the scheme of arrangement framework, 
the starting point is that the intended arrange-
ment should have the support of a clear ma-
jority of each class, on whose position the in-
tended arrangement has any impact. Hence, 
this should not have any valuation correlation. 
Thus, valua tion may also be involved, indirect-
ly, in a scheme process.
Jennifer Payne has outlined the possibility 
of combining a scheme process with a pre-pack 
administration in order to achieve, in effect, a 
cram-down of junior creditors or equity holders:
‘Schemes alone cannot at present achieve the 
cramdown of junior creditors (or holders of equi-
ty, note by M.E.) within a company. It appears 
that, while cramdown within a class is possible, 
cramdown across classes is not, i.e. it is not pos-
sible to implement a scheme in circumstances 
in which a whole class of creditors (such as the 
junior creditors) votes against the scheme. De-
spite the decision in Re Tea Corporation Ltd, in 
which the ordinary shareholders voted against 
the schemes, but had their dissent disregarded at 
the sanctioning stage, on the basis that they had 
no economic interest in the company’s assets, the 
view taken by the courts today is that the court 
does not have power to sanction a scheme where 
that scheme has not been approved by a class of 
the members or creditors.’ ...
‘As a result, these restructuring arrangements 
have been implemented by way of scheme twin-
ned with a pre-pack administration, in order to 
effectively reach the same result as the cramdown 
of a whole class.’22
As a standalone process, a scheme of arrange-
ment should address the voting of all classes 
and respect the majorities of such voting. Ne-
vertheless, due to the fact that it is up to the 
22 Jennifer Payne, Schemes of Arrangement, The-
ory, Structure and Operation, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2014 240-242
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company to assess the parties to be called to 
the scheme consultation, the court may accept, 
in connection with related insolvency proceed-
ings, the implementation of the restructuring, 
notwithstanding a dissenting majority of a class 
of junior creditors or shareholders.
7. Options for Implementing the Restructu-
ring Directive
The Restructuring Directive is drafted from 
an insolvency law point of view. However, it 
covers issues which are customarily viewed 
as company law topics. As noted, the Direc-
tive even rules that the Member States should 
be able to derogate from the requirements laid 
down in Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council (21) con-
cerning the obligations to convene a general 
meeting and to offer shares to existing share-
holders on a pre-emptive basis, to the extent and 
for the period necessary to ensure that share-
holders do not frustrate restructuring efforts 
by abusing their rights under that Directive. It 
states further that the Directive (EU) 2017/1132 
should be amended accordingly.
For the implementation of the Directive, it is 
important to understand that it only lays down 
the set objectives for minimum harmonisation 
and provides flexibility for the Member States 
for its implementation. Recital 16 of the Directive 
emphasises that ‘Member States should be able to 
maintain or introduce in their national legal systems 
preventive restructuring frameworks other than 
those provided for by this Directive’. Such a fra-
mework can also be a company law frame work.
Further, Recital 29 of the Directive states:
‘[w]here this Directive is implemented by means 
of more than one procedure within a restructu-
ring framework, the debtor should have access 
to all rights and safeguards provided for by this 
Directive with the aim of achieving an effective 
restructuring.’
Thus, a Member State may have several diffe-
rent frameworks for restructuring, provided 
that the minimum harmonisation requirements 
are fulfilled. France, Spain, Italy and UK, inter 
alias, already have several operative regimes.
Hence, the implementation of the Directive 
can be conducted in different ways, depending 
on the pre-existing frameworks in the respective 
Member State. As an example, all Nordic coun-
tries have existing regimes for restructuring al-
ready in place. These do not, however, include 
a possibility for the standalone ‘workout’ of a 
single credit facility.
An alternative for implementation would 
be to adjust the current restructuring regime to 
include a possibility for a single credit workout, 
without involving other creditors of the relevant 
company to the extent that their positions are 
unaltered, and to tackle the above-mentioned 
issues relating to debt-to-equity conversions un-
der the same framework. A recent government 
proposal for new legislation in the Netherlands 
would serve as a good benchmark for this.
The second alternative, favored by the 
authors, is to consider a new scheme of arran-
gement framework based on the European Mo-
del Company Act (the ‘EMCA’) to cover the key 
areas of the preventive restructuring, whilst also 
providing sensible company law tools relating 
to cross-class cram-down of equity in connec-
tion with a related insolvency proceeding.23 The 
EMCA was created by leading corporate law 
scholars, who made a decision, based on reason-
ed analyses, to include a section for a scheme of 
arrangement in the model companies act.
In any case, the position of shareholders in 
a restructuring, particularly the availability of a 
cross-class cram-down mechanism and the de-
cision between optional methodologies – i.e. be-
tween relative or absolute priority – in the case 
23 Andersen, Paul K. – Andersson, Jan B. edit. 
European Model Companies Act First edition, 
2017, NORDIC & EUROPEAN COMPANY 
LAW LSN Research Paper Series, No. 16-26.
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of dissenting classes, gives rise to the need for 
further analysis of potential changes to current 
regimes.
8. Constitutional Law and the Market Value 
Guarantee
Professor Stephan Madaus has outlined the main 
constitutional law issues relating to preventive re-
structuring arrangements. He refers to a market 
value guarantee under constitutio nal law:
‘Moreover, constitutional law guarantees may 
limit the right to impose a contract (or plan). The 
right to property is protected in many constitu-
tions and usually covers the possession of claims 
and shares. Any impairment without consent 
usually requires a general interest in the im-
pairment, due process and a compensation. In 
such a setting, any impairment of a claim of a 
holdout creditor or of shares of an equity holder 
would require the involvement of a court. The 
latter would need to check whether the plan ser-
ves the general interest-usually the macroecono-
mic purposes shown above (debt cancellation and 
prevention of underuse). The court would also 
review whether all parties were treated fairly in 
the process (timely informed and asked to vote) 
and whether any impairment requires compen-
sation. While no compensation is necessary as 
long as the plan only reduces a claim or share 
from its nominal to its current market value, any 
further impairment must be compensated. This 
constitutional law background led the common 
approach to compare the value of the firm in a 
no-plan scenario with the value of the firm in 
the plan scenario – the ‘best interest test’ or ‘no 
creditor worse off principle.’24
Addressing constitutional law issues in relation 
to the scheme of arrangement framework is not 
24 Stephan Madaus Leaving the Shadows of US 
Bankruptcy Law: A Proposal to Divide the Re-
alms of Insolvency and Restucturing Law, Eur 
Bus Org Law Rev (2018) 19, 636
a simple task. As an analogy for this analysis, 
the co-author discussed the Finnish view on the 
abuse of law in his dissertation. In Finnish legal 
practice and literature, it has been noted that the 
standing on the abuse of law is negative; fully 
legal rights have been considered able to be re-
stricted through a court judgment, in the event 
that the legal rights of a third party would have 
been jeopardised through such abuse.
As a constitutional normative justification, 
the co-author uses for guidance the narrative 
repeated by the English courts in scheme of ar-
rangement rulings. English law requires that 
the sanctioned arrangement is such that an in-
telligent and honest man, a member of the class 
concerned and acting in respect of his interest, 
might reasonably approve it. It further requi-
res that the statutory majority is acting bona 
fide and is not coercing the minority in order to 
pro mote interests adverse to those of the class 
whom they purport to represent.25
From a constitutional law point of view, it 
should be noted that a scheme of arrangement 
mechanism in company law would merely form 
a framework, under which a court would make 
a judgment in each specific case, taking into ac-
count the normative grounds of the respective 
law, including constitutional law.
9. Who Owns the Equity?
When considering writing this article, the 
authors noted the importance of addressing 
a particularly polemic question, namely; who 
owns a company’s equity? A company re-
structuring is always made in the shadow of 
a bankruptcy, under a risk that the holders of 
the company equity can lose their ownership. 
Customarily, in a bankruptcy, creditors also suf-
fer substantially, as the value of the company 
may normally be clearly higher as a going con-
cern.
25 Jennifer Payne, Schemes of Arrangement The-
ory, Structure and Operation, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2014 73
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Under any accounting rules, it is evident 
that all funds invested in a company, whether 
in the form of equity or debt, constitute assets 
of the company. Nevertheless, the agency rela-
tionship in corporate law between shareholders 
on one hand, and creditors on the other, is a key 
point for legislators to understand. Hansmann 
and Kraakman outline this through examples:
‘To take a conspicuous example in the corporate 
context, rules of law that protect creditors from 
opportunistic behavior on the part of corpora-
tions should reduce the interest rate that cor-
porations must pay for credit, thus benefiting 
corporations as well as creditors. Likewise, legal 
constraints on the ability of controlling share-
holders to expropriate minority shareholders 
should reduce the cost of outside equity capital 
for corporations. And rules of law that inhibit 
insider trading by corporate managers should 
increase the compensation that shareholders are 
willing to offer the managers. In general, reduc-
ing agency costs is in the interests of all parties 
to a transaction, principals and agents alike.’ 26
Due to the factors mentioned in Section 6, the 
valuation of a distressed company is ‘noisy’. Pri-
or to insolvency, the environment of a distres-
sed company is challenging – it is a particularly 
difficult area not only for a court to judge, but 
also for legislators to regulate. Still, it is impor-
tant to note, as a principle, that the equity of 
the company may be finally, but not ultimately, 
owned by the shareholders – who would have 
at any stage a collective right to liquidate the 
firm and to receive back the remaining funds 
put into the firm as equity. This right is the  basis 
of their direct asset – shares in the company. 
Therefore, under company law principles, the 
shareholders are, until insolvency, entitled to 
26 H.Hansmann – R.Kraakman Agency Problems 
and Legal Strategies Yale Law School Center 
for Law, Economics and Public Policy Re-
search Paper No. 301 2004
decide on issues involving their assets – shares 
of ownership of the company.
At the crossroads of company and insolven-
cy law, a legislator should therefore address 
both of these areas of law.
Understandably, in proceedings based on 
insolvency law, one may consider that it is  prima 
facie possible to override certain aspects of com-
pany law. However, at least for the clarity of 
the two areas of law, sufficient regard should 
nevertheless be had to issues of company law 
when operating in the insolvency law sphere, 
and vice versa.
Assuming that the restructuring laws of 
a country permit a debt-for-equity swap, the 
way that the swap is achieved should also be 
con sidered from a company law point of view. 
How the new shares should be issued, who 
should decide the proper issue price on which 
the relevant debt should be converted into 
 share capital and how different classes of shares 
should be treated are examples of company law 
questions that may arise. To the extent that any 
converted debt entitles a debtor to a position of 
control over the company, minority protections 
for existing equity holders under company law 
may also play a role.
As a benchmark for this regulation, the 
authors see merit in the English law dual-pro-
cess system, where a process may begin as a 
standalone preventive restructuring ruled un-
der company law, but under which it is also able 
to combine, if needed, a company law scheme 
of arrangement with an insolvency law admini-
stration process. In such a dual-process model, 
the rights of shareholders arising under com-
pany law would be duly considered.
10. Conclusion – options for legislators
To conclude, the benefits of schemes of arran-
gement have been widely recognised; leading 
European corporate law professionals have ad-
dressed their potential benefits, and provisions 
on schemes of arrangement have been included 
in the model act EMCA.
36151_NTS_nr1_2020.indd   71 15-04-2020   10:03:53
Side 72  NTS  |  Nr. 1  |  2020
Seppo Villa & Matti Engelberg 
Incorporating the scheme of arrangement 
regime in the Member States would, de minimis, 
provide legal protection for a clear majority of 
holders of a debt or equity instrument against 
the dissentient minority of the same class, in 
circumstances where the minority may be con-
sidered to be acting against the joint economic 
interest of the respective instrument.
The new Restructuring Directive calls for 
early-stage preventive frameworks, which al-
low workout -type transactions, involving 
creditors only of a single credit facility. Based on 
the current regimes inter alia in the Nordic coun-
tries, this is not currently an option – the only 
alternative is to enter into a full restructuring 
involving all of the creditors of the company.
Given that the recent trend of diversifica-
tion in financing is providing further possibi-
lities for opportunistic market players to uti-
lise aggressively their minority holdout rights 
in different financial instruments, the protec-
tions provided by the scheme of arrangement 
framework are becoming increasingly impor-
tant. In various jurisdictions, therefore, the in-
troduction of scheme of arrangement provisions 
would diminish the opportunities available to 
activist funds.
By being as prompt and smart as these ac-
tivist funds, European legislators could create 
a more stable and predictable environment for 
businesses. When seeking the best future mo-
del for implementing the Directive, it is highly 
important to understand the various systemic 
options for regulating this essential area for cor-
porates, which is customarily defined as preven-
tive restructuring.27
27 Matti Engelberg, the proposed EU framework 
for preventive restructuring and the English 
schemes of arrangement regime—seeking the 
best Preventive model for each Member State 
Capital Markets Law Journal, Volume 14, Issue 
2, April 2019 273
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